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Executive Summary 
Explorers have made breakthroughs in many fields of astrophysics. The early Explorer 
program included UHURU, and the restructured, post-1988, program included COBE. The 
science from both these missions contributed to three of the Nobel Prizes – Giacconi (2002), 
Mather, and Smoot (2006) - awarded for NASA-based science. Explorers now operating have 
marked the definitive beginning of precision cosmology, have discovered that short gamma-ray 
bursts are caused by compact star mergers and have measured metallicity to redshifts z>6. 
NASA Explorers do cutting-edge science that simply cannot be done by facility-class 
instruments.  
The goal of the NASA Explorer program is to provide a rapid response to changing science 
and technology in order to enable cutting-edge science at moderate cost. In addition, Explorers 
enable innovation, and engage & train scientists, managers and engineers, adding human capital to 
NASA and the nation. The astrophysics Explorer launch rate actually being achieved is 1 per 3 
years. Explorer budget projections are currently in the $150M/year range for the next five years. 
We believe that to enable the program goals, a newly Vigorous Explorer Program should be 
created, within which Astrophysics Explorers: 
1. Reach the long-stated goal of annual astrophysics launches;  realization of this goal 
would have a stongly positive and measurable impact on science and the community; 
2. Find additional launch options for Explorers and actively encourage cost savings in 
launchers and spacecraft, such as new commercial vehicles and innovative partnerships. 
3. Mitigate risk via stronger technical development and sub-orbital programs, and through 
longer and more thorough Phase A programs, potentially reducing the need for a 30% 
contingency; 
4. Strive hard to protect the funding for missions that have reached Phase B, to prevent 
significant launch slips and cancellations, with a goal of 4 to 5 years from Phase B to 
launch; 
5. Review the project management procedures and requirements to seek cost reductions, 
including the risk management strategy and the review and reporting process; 
6. Review and possibly modify the cost caps for all Explorer classes to optimize scientific 
returns per dollar; 
7. Otherwise follow the recommendations of the 2006 PILMSS NAS/NRC report (Appendix 
A).
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INTRODUCTION 
The 2001 decadal review "Astronomy and Astrophysics in the New Millenium" endorsed the 
continuation of "a vigorous Explorer Program". We strongly agree, and go further, by calling 
for the realization of the long stated goal of an annual astrophysics Explorer launch rate. The 
2001 decadal review did not provide a detailed exposition of its endorsement of "a vigorous 
Explorer Program", and contained only brief statements endorsing a small/medium/large balance 
of programs. Again, we go further, also calling for a dynamic investigation of ways in which the 
Explorer program can be made even more effective, such as an adoption of the widest possible 
range of options to which PI's can propose. 
The Explorer program goal is to provide rapid response to changing science and technology to 
enable cutting-edge science at moderate cost. This goal can be broken down into four elements1:  
A. Explorers fill critical science gaps in areas that are not addressed by strategic 
missions, 
B. they support the rapid implementation of attacks on very focused topics, and  
C. they provide for innovation and the use of new approaches that are difficult to 
incorporate into the long planning cycles needed to get a mission into the strategic 
mission queues… .  
D. The Explorers also provide a particularly substantial means to engage and train 
science and engineering students in the full life cycle of space research projects.  
We detail below both the strengths of the Explorer program, and the challenges that this 
program faces. We have structured this White Paper around these four ‘vital contributions’ in 
order to illustrate the current situation. In this section we address the first, ‘Science Gaps’. The 
‘Technical Overview’ section addresses the other three. We draw heavily on the 2006 NAS/NRC 
report on “Principal Investigator Led Missions in the Space Sciences” (PILMSS2), which 
examined many of these challenges.  
 
                                                
1 NRC, 2004, Solar and Space Physics and Its Role in Space Exploration, Washington, D.C.: 
The National Academies Press, p. 20. Bullet letters added. 
 
2 http://www.nap.edu/catalog.php?record_id=10949#toc 
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KEY SCIENCE GOALS 
 
The Explorer Program - Overview 
The Explorer Program is NASA’s oldest flight program dedicated to science investigations. 
Explorer 1 was launched January 31, 1958. Swift, the most recent (launched successfully on 
November 20, 2004), is the 84th3 in the series. The 2001 NRC report “Astronomy and 
Astrophysics in the New Millennium” finds that “the Explorer program is very successful and 
has elicited many highly innovative, cost-effective proposals for small missions from the 
community.”  
In 1988 the Explorer Program was reconstituted as a competed, PI-led, program, following the 
PI mode established for the Discovery Program. The introduction of cost caps on the RXTE and 
ACE missions was part of this transition. FUSE became the first mission fully led by a PI and 
cost-capped. The Explorer program was highly active between 1995 and 2003, with six MIDEX 
and five SMEXs were selected for flight, though two were eventually cancelled. The program 
then had a drastic drop off, with no missions selected between 2003 and 2009 and a temporary 
cancellation. 
There are currently two categories of Explorer missions: Small Explorers (SMEX), and 
Medium Explorers (MIDEX). SMEX missions allowed for increased levels of PI leadership 
while maintaining project management responsibility at GSFC (e.g. TRACE, SWAS, WIRE)4.  
SMEX and MIDEX missions had cost caps of $120 million, and $180 million, respectively 
[2004 numbers], adjusted for inflation at the discretion of NASA depending on the circumstances 
of selection timing or delays. The cost cap for each of these mission lines has been adjusted over 
time with each new AO. The 2008 SMEX AO limited PI Mission Cost to $105M. Note that, 
while launch costs are excluded from this cost, a 30% contingency is required. 
Since 1988 there have been 5 SMEX AOs, and 3 MIDEX AOs. Each AO also solicits 
proposals for missions of opportunity (MoOs). Typically, some 30 proposed projects compete for 
2 flight opportunities in each AO (see Table 3.1).  
TABLE 3.1 Statistics on Proposals Submitted for Explorer Missions (from PILMSS, 
with 2008 details added. SOURCE: NASA, Science Mission Directorate.) 
Year Explorer No. of Proposalsa Phase A Selected Full Missionsc 
1997 SMEX 46 total, 40 full n/a RHESSI, GALEX 
1998 UNEX 29 total, 23 full n/a CHIPS (MoO), IMEX 
1998 MIDEX 31 total, 27 full 5 Swift, FAME (cancelled) 
1999 SMEX 33 total, 21 full 7 SPIDR (cancelled), AIM 
2001 MIDEX 31 total, 21 full 4 THEMIS, WISE 
2003 
2008 
SMEX 
SMEX 
29 total, 22 full 
49 total, 32 full 
5 
6b 
IBEX, NuSTAR 
GEMS,JANUS,TESS,CPEX, IRIS, NICE 
a “Full” refers to full missions. “Total” includes mission of opportunity proposals; b 
Downselect expected Fall 2009. c. Astrophysics missions are in bold face.  
                                                
3 http://www.planet4589.org/space/misc/explorer.html 
4 A smaller category of University-class Explorers (UNEX), with a cost cap of $15 million is on hold after only one 
AO, pending the availability of a suitable small (<$10 million) U.S. launch vehicle. 
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Launch Rate 
Many believe, as we do, that a higher astrophysics Explorer launch rate of approximately 1 per 
year is needed to achieve the Explorer goals of providing a rapid response to changing science 
and technology in order to do cutting-edge science at moderate cost.  
The launch rate actually being achieved in astrophysics is 1 per 3 years. There have been 6 
astrophysics launches in the 21 years since the first SMEX AO (SWAS, GALEX, WIRE, FUSE, 
Swift, WMAP). With a seventh due in 2009 (WISE), an eighth in 2011 (NuSTAR) and one more 
in astrophysics by 2015, leading to 9 launches in 27 years. 
There is a long history of calls from the community for one astrophysics launch per year: 
Three 1991  reports had this recommendation. The Bahcall Report had the following language 
(p.118): "The committee recommends that NASA increase the rate of Explorer missions for 
astronomy and astrophysics to six Delta-class and five SMEX missions per decade." The Space 
Studies Board report says the following about the solar/heliosphere/Earth's magnetosphere 
Explorer program (there is no corresponding section on astrophysics): "The recommended level 
of an average of one Explorer per year for solar and space physics has not been reached, 
however, because cost overruns in the current Explorer program continue to cause delays." 
Finally, the  Office of Space Science and Applications Strategic Plan had the following program 
guidelines: "We endeavor to start a small mission or a small mission program every year, in 
conjunction with either a major or moderate mission." 
Within NASA, the earliest NASA budget request available online (1999), NASA, less 
explicitly, stated that "The goal of the Explorer Program is to provide frequent, low-cost access 
to space...", and more recent Roadmaps and Strategic Plans employ similar language. NASA has 
used the approximately annual explorers objective in its planning process. NASA's presentation 
to the SEUS and OS "The Explorer Planning Budget will support the missions currently under 
development plus  • 2 MIDEX & 2 SMEX every 3 years (planning program) …" (Paul Hertz, July 
2, 2003). This expected SMEX/MIDEX launch rate of 2 each per 3 years, or roughly one SMEX 
per year and a MIDEX every other year, split evenly between Sun-Earth Connection and 
Astrophysics was not however realized in practice.  
A major conclusion of this White Paper that the realization of the long-standing goals of both 
the external review committees and of NASA itself, is now timely for adoption as a major NASA 
goal in the decade 2010-2020. 
A. Science Gaps: Cutting-edge Science on a Budget 
If Explorers fulfilled their three other roles – rapid implementation, innovation, and engaging & 
training personnel - but did not do front rank science, then the program should not exist. In fact, 
Explorers have made breakthroughs in many fields of astrophysics. The Explorer program has 
distinguished history, present, and future, doing cutting-edge science that simply cannot be done 
by facility-class instruments. The early Explorer program included UHURU, and the restructured 
program post-1988 included COBE, the science from both of which contributed to three of the 
Nobel Prizes awarded for NASA-based science – Giacconi (2002), Mather, and Smoot (2006). 
Post-1988 Science 
Despite the limited launch rate since the 1988 MIDEX/SMEX re-structuring, the astronomy 
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Explorer missions have covered many fields of astronomy: millimeter spectroscopy (SWAS), 
UV and far-UV imaging and spectroscopy (FUSE, GALEX), cosmology using the cosmic 
microwave background (WMAP), gamma-ray bursts (Swift), with only one payload failure 
(WIRE).  
 
Post-1988 Explorer accomplishments include: 
 
WMAP: marked the definitive beginning of precision cosmology: 
• Age of Universe, 13.73±0.12 Gyr; 
• Baryon fraction, Ω(baryons) = 4.6±0.1% of the universe. 
• Ω(dark matter) = 23.3±1.3%; 
• Ω(dark energy) = 72.1±1.5%; 
• Spacetime curvature is within 1% of Euclidean, improving on the precision of previous 
award-winning measurements by over an order of magnitude; 
• Set the epoch of re-ionization to z~15 
FUSE:  
• Detected of He+ re-ionization at redshifts less than; 
• Traced the ‘missing baryons’ in the local intergalactic medium; 
• Challenged models of Galactic chemical evolution. (high values of D/H in the Milky 
Way disk.) 
• Eliminated starbursts as significant contributors to IGM ionization at the present epoch. 
(Very low escape fractions of Lyman continuum.) 
• Found H2 in nearly all sightlines through the Galactic ISM and halo, substantially 
increasing the mass of H2 out of the Galactic plane. 
GALEX: Discovery of - 
• Local starburst analogs of high redshift Lyman Break Galaxies; 
• Stellar tidal disruption flares from otherwise inactive massive black holes; 
• The remarkable turbulent wind wake of Mira and its cousin, CW Leo; 
• New regimes of star formation: extended disks, primordial HI clouds, tidal tails; 
• Uniformly observed star formation history of Universe over the last 7 Gyrs. 
SWAS: found - 
• Water vapor is present in almost all star-forming regions 
• Gas-phase water abundance peaks near molecular surfaces;  
• Molecular clouds have an abundance of water-ice in their interiors . 
•  
Swift, the #1 ranked mission from the 2008 Senior Review in science/dollar: 
• discovery that short gamma-ray bursts are caused by compact star mergers 
• first detection of an X-ray flash from the shock break out from a supernova 
• metallicity measurements to redshifts z>6 using gamma-ray bursts 
 
Explorers can also directly complement the flagship missions: wide area surveys of the sort 
done by GALEX, Swift/BAT and, soon, by WISE, simply cannot be done by the flagship 
missions. Explorer class surveys are, moreover, essential for finding the best targets so that the 
full potential of NASA’s flagship Observatories can be realized. They serve in the same way that 
the 48-inch Palomar Schmidt Sky Survey did for the Palomar 200-inch, and for many later large 
telescopes, and as does the SDSS does today. 
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Earlier Explorers also had great impact:  
COBE:  Nobel Prize winning science - 
• CMB spectrum found to be a black body to high accuracy: 2.725±0.002K; 
• 1:100000CMB fluctuations, consistent with CDM cosmology; 
• First IR background constraints on models of the history of star formation and the buildup 
over time of heavy elements and dust. 
RXTE: Discovery of: 
• the fastest oscillations known from astrophysical sources (kHz QPOs) ; 
• changes on dynamical time-scales in stellar-mass black holes (ms QPOs); 
• nuclear powered pulsars, (pulsations during thermonuclear X-ray bursts); 
• connections between radio jet formation and accretion disk instabilities. 
• frequencies that scale inversely with the mass from stellar to supermassive black holes. 
EUVE:  
• First survey of sky at ‘unobservable’ EUV wavelengths 
• Detection of thermal EUV emission from neutron star surfaces 
• First measurement of stellar coronal abundances. 
• hot hydrogen-rich white dwarf atsmopheres opacity due to high Z elements, not He. 
 
Continuing Strength 
There is strong evidence that there continue to be many excellent new ideas for Explorer-class 
missions. This can be easily found by the 15:1 oversubscription rate of every AO, and by looking 
at the projects now in development: NuSTAR and WISE in phase C/D (design/build), and three, 
GEMS, JANUS and TESS, now in Phase A (concept study) prior to down-selection.  
 
WISE, PI: Edward Wright (UCLA, Los Angeles CA), is a MIDEX which will provide an all-sky 
survey from 3 to 25 µm with 500 times the sensitivity of IRAS. The 6-month survey, beginning 
early 2010, will help search for the origins of planets, stars, and galaxies and create an enduring 
legacy infrared atlas. WISE will find the most luminous galaxies in the Universe; find the closest 
stars to the Sun; detect most Main Belt asteroids larger than 3 km; enable a wide variety of 
studies ranging from the evolution of planetary debris disks to the history of star formation in 
normal galaxies; and will provide an important source catalog for JWST. 
 
NuSTAR, PI Fiona Harrison (CalTech, Pasadena CA), is a SMEX, now scheduled for launch in 
mid-2011 that exploits innovative technology, graded multi-layer mirrors. Multi-layer mirror 
technology uses resonant Bragg reflection to create focusing optics up to energies as high as 80 
keV, so reducing background by 1-2 orders of magnitude. NuSTAR will investigate key 
questions arising from earlier work: defining the population of supermassive black holes in 
galactic nuclei and the creation and dispersion of the elements in supernovae, and will explore 
genuinely new territory -- discovering hard X-ray sources at far fainter fluxes, and in far greater 
numbers than have been accessible before.   
 
Six SMEX missions are now in Phase A studies pending a downselect in the Fall of 20095. 
                                                
5 http://www.nasa.gov/home/hqnews/2008/may/HQ_C08029_SMEX_Awards.html 
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Three are non-solar astrophysics missions, and so lie within the Astro2010 remit: 
Gravity and Extreme Magnetism SMEX (GEMS), PI: Jean Swank (NASA GSFC, Greenbelt, 
MD) - GEMS will use an X-ray polarimetry to track the flow of highly magnetized matter into 
supermassive black holes. 
Joint Astrophysics Nascent Universe Satellite (JANUS), PI: Peter Roming (Penn State 
University, University Park, PA) - JANUS will use a gamma-ray burst monitor to point its 
infrared telescope at the most distant galaxies to measure the star-formation history of the 
universe. 
Transiting Exoplanet Survey Satellite (TESS), PI: George Ricker (MIT, Cambridge MA) - 
TESS will use a bank of six telescopes to observe the brightest 2.5 million stars and discover 
more than 1,000 Earth-to-Jupiter-sized planets around them. 
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TECHNICAL OVERVIEW 
B. Rapid Implementation 
The Explorer program can react to new scientific discoveries with much shorter turn-around 
than large missions (or decadal studies). Low launch rates threaten this rapid response. 
Swift is an example. The detection of X-ray afterglows from Gamma-ray bursts (GRBs) by the 
Italian-Netherlands mission Beppo-SAX6 led to the first identification of a GRB a year after 
launch (GRB 970402) and settled the 24-year old dispute - are GRBs isotropic because they are 
very nearby, or because they are cosmologically distant? – in favor of powerful events in distant 
galaxies. But Beppo-SAX was not designed with GRB identifications in mind. A dedicated 
mission could go from a handful of identified GRBs to hundreds. Within 5 years Swift had been 
successfully launched, and now, 5 years later, has achieved its promise, with 236 GRBs 
identified, 57% with redshifts, including one at z=5.6 (GRB060927), and a wealth of new GRB 
physics being revealed. 
WMAP gives a slightly less dramatic but useful example. The extraordinary COBE results on 
the spectrum and fluctuations of the CMB were reported in 1990-1992. The MAP proposal was 
made in 1995, and selected in 1996, with launch following 5 years later, in March 2001.  
C. Innovation: 
The Explorer program provides a quick path to scientific use for newly-developed technology, 
and thereby allow quick exploration of entirely new territory as soon as the technology is ready. 
This technology is often then used in other, larger programs. Recent examples programs include: 
WMAP: was the first mission to demonstrate the viability of operating at L2. WMAP also made 
extensive use of passive cooling, developing and validating many techniques for some of the 
design concepts adopted by JWST. 
FUSE, GALEX: there is a direct line from the development of microchannel plate detectors and 
holographically ruling aberration corrected gratings on sounding rockets to GALEX and 
FUSE, and ultimately to the Cosmic Origins Spectrograph (COS) for HST. COS would not exist 
without FUSE. 
NuSTAR: Multilayers for X-ray and EUV optics were first tested on sounding rockets imaging 
the solar corona in the 1980's, and led to the SMEX satellite TRACE, launched exactly 10 years 
ago, which led in turn to the much larger set of telescopes known as AIA, about to be launched 
on the Solar Dynamics Observatory. The high energy mirrors of NuSTAR are closely related. 
NuSTAR mirrors are pathfinders for the IXO Hard X-ray Telescope. 
Swift: Swift has pioneered the use of extremely rapid and autonomous response to celestial 
events and community submitted Targets of Opportunity. Swift has reacted within 52 seconds to 
newly discovered GRBs from the on-board detectors, and within 43 minutes to ground-based 
responses from other observatories. Swift helps all missions by demonstrating a ‘lights-out 
monitoring’ capability to keep operations cost at a minimum, while still responding to 
astronomical discoveries on a 24/7 basis. 
                                                
6http://heasarc.gsfc.nasa.gov/docs/sax/sax.html 
 10 
D. Engage and train: 
The NASA Explorer program has wider value, beyond the immediate science return, to both 
the space program, and to the technological health of the nation. By first engaging the 
imagination of scientists and engineers, and then providing broad, hands-on, training, the 
Explorer program adds human capital to NASA and the nation. 
The PILMSS report recognized this: “The science return [of the Explorer program] is in fact 
much broader than just the new knowledge about space science enabled by a specific mission, 
and the PI-led programs play a particularly important role in these crucial, ancillary aspects:  
(1) training the next generation of scientists and engineers,  
(2) strengthening the scientific and technical infrastructure, including instrument and 
spacecraft developers, launch services, and the institutions that manage this complex enterprise,  
(3) generating excitement in the science and larger communities via the PI-led project team’s 
enthusiastic promotion of the mission.” (p.47, emphasis added.) 
The Explorer program itself supplies numerous training stories. E.g. Charles Bennett was 
Deputy PI for DMR on service on COBE, which gave him the experience necessary to be PI of 
WMAP. Similarly, Ned Wright was also a COBE co-I and is now PI for WISE. 
The Explorer program also enlarges the pool of commercial companies capable of building 
spacecraft by involving more institutions and commercial companies in the scientific space 
program. Engineers and management at the various industrial partners are always enthusiastic 
about Explorers, even though they freely acknowledge that they will make little money from 
these projects. These missions engage and challenge the engineers in ways that their commercial 
business generally doesn't.  
The relatively low current Explorer launch rate limits these benefits. Riccardo Giacconi has 
recently stated7 that: “NASA has not achieved the balance between very large, medium and small 
missions that the community has advocated for years. This lack of smaller, principal 
investigators and university led missions makes it very difficult to train the experimental 
scientists of tomorrow.” It is significant, then, that a number of industrial partners, such as 
General Dynamics, decided not to participate in the most recent (2008) SMEX round because the 
cost cap was too tight.  
A vigorous Explorer program, with much more frequent launches than over the past two 
decades, will accelerate all of these important training and engagement benefits, growing the 
aerospace science, management and engineering capability available to NASA, and to the 
nation.  
                                                
7 Astro2010 State of the Profession White paper, Giacconi_management_FFP_IPP[1].pdf 
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TECHNOLOGY DRIVERS 
1. Launcher and Spacecraft Costs and Capabilities:  
Launcher: 
The DOD has recently moved from the Delta II rocket to the significantly more capable, but 
also more expensive, Delta IV and Atlas V rockets for military launches. NASA cannot afford to 
support the Delta II program on its own, and now has only light rockets (Pegasus, 450 kg to 
LEO, and Taurus8, 1350 kg to LEO) and heavy lift vehicles (Delta IV, Atlas V, 8.6-29.4 tonnes 
to LEO) as options for launches. Explorers are sensitive to this gap in lift capability because, 
after subtracting the mass of the spacecraft, there is little mass remaining for instruments on light 
vehicles, while a single heavy lift vehicle is as expensive as the entire Explorer budget. We 
encourage NASA to seek new launch capabilities to fill this strategic gap in moderate lift rockets 
to enable the Explorer program to continue launching missions with significant science payoff 
but reduced costs and timescales compared to large strategic missions. We are encouraged by the 
planned use of a Minotaur IV by NASA for the upcoming LADEE lunar mission. 
For light launchers, the high cost of Pegasus and Taurus puts a heavy burden on Explorers. 
While NASA is strictly prohibited from buying foreign launchers, their pricing structure sets a 
plausible goal, with Taurus-class ~1-tonne payloads to LEO available in the $10M-$18M range9. 
There are cheaper, and somewhat more capable, US built launch vehicles available either now or 
in the near-term10: the Minotaur (based on the Minuteman ICBM with Taurus upper stages,), and 
the new SpaceX Falcon 1. The Minotaur family can put 580kg (Minotaur I) to 1,700 kg 
(Minotaur IV, equivalent to a Delta-II) into LEO. Seven USAF Minotaur launches have taken 
place so far, all successful. The liquid-fueled Falcon 1 has achieved LEO and is currently 
anticipated to deliver 420kg (Falcon 1) to 1010 kg (Falcon 1e) to LEO for $7.9M to $9.1M. 
Spacecraft: 
The costs for a basic spacecraft bus, integration and test, a control center, ground station 
access, data processing, and a minimal science team, leaves little money left for an instrument 
payload. The mission assurance requirements imposed on the spacecraft have a large impact on 
the spacecraft cost. Yet, the S/C bus and some of the support electronics and software are off-
the-shelf items, most subsystems being highly standardized. Is there scope for reducing costs 
here? Relaxation of NASA EEE parts assurance requirements to levels acceptable by commercial 
customers may result in substantial savings, including indirect ones, as e.g. increased radiation-
hardness costs in mass and power. While taking shortcuts in performance or qualification testing 
adds risk, but needs to be balanced against the larger risk that comes from the most innovative 
subsystems of the mission, which tend to be the ones in the payload. We urge NASA to welcome 
and encourage initiatives to reduce spacecraft costs e.g. the CREST Astro2010 White Paper11. 
                                                
8 http://www.orbital.com/SpaceLaunch/Pegasus/, http://www.orbital.com/SpaceLaunch/Taurus/ 
9 PSLV: www.antrix.gov.in; Rokot: www.eurockot.com; Kosmos-3M: www.cosmos-space.de; 
Dnepr: www.kosmotras.ru; Vega: http://www.arianespace.com/launch-services-
vega/vega_overview.asp 
10 http://www.orbital.com/SpaceLaunch/Minotaur/, http://www.spacex.com/falcon1.php 
11 “Center for Research on Experimental Satellite Technology”, Chakrabarty et al. (2009). 
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2. Management and costing: 
The Explorer program has the potential to provide innovation in management processes. The 
PILMSS wrote: “Finding. The space science community believes that the scientific effectiveness 
of PI-led missions is largely due to the direct involvement of PIs in shaping the decisions and the 
mission approach to realizing the proposed science concepts.” The correct PI-NASA balance is 
hard to find. NASA naturally tends towards taking major roles in the Explorers to minimize risk.  
Analyzing Risk: 
To allow for the risks and resulting cost growth in Explorers, NASA requires a 30% 
Contingency Funds for Explorers. In small cost-capped missions, with fixed launch and 
inflexible spacecraft costs, a blanket 30% contingency has a disproportionate impact on the 
scientific payload. On the surface, 30% is a reasonable figure, based on “The average increase in 
development costs for PI-led Explorers is 30.8 percent compared with the 18.3 percent for the 
other recent missions, though just two cases—Swift and GALEX—are the cause of the high 
average.” (PILMSS) 
Another approach would be to diagnose the most common causes of overruns and then try to 
minimize them. If validated, the Explorer contingency could then be prudently reduced. Much of 
the current payload risk stems from technology development challenges. The PILMSS 
“examined five Explorer missions (RHESSI, Swift, IMAGE, GALEX, and WMAP) (see their 
Table 5.2); on average, their development cost increased 30.8 percent. Two of the missions, 
Swift and GALEX, showed particularly large increases in development costs, 68.8 percent and 
52.8 percent, respectively, over their selection cost caps. Both Swift and GALEX encountered 
problems related to immature technology, which probably contributed to the cost and schedule 
overruns …”.  The PILMSS report (Chapter 5, p.39) concluded that NASA could address these 
technology development overruns by taking action in two areas: pre-proposal, and phase-A 
studies. The 2008 Phase A studies were just $750k. We re-iterate their recommendations 
(emphasis added):  
PILMSS recommendation #5. “NASA should set aside meaningful levels of regular funding in 
PI-led programs to sponsor relevant, competed technology development efforts. The results from 
these program-oriented activities should be made openly available on the program library Web 
site and in articles published in journals or on the World Wide Web.” 
PILMSS recommendation #2. “NASA should increase the funding for and duration of 
concept studies (Phase A) to ensure that more accurate information on cost, schedule, and 
technical readiness is available for final selection of PI-led missions.” 
We agree with this assessment, and further link adequate technology development for 
Explorers to the existence of a healthy sub-orbital program. We urge NASA to thoroughly 
review the Explorer development and contingency rules with the goal of fulfilling these 
recommendations. 
Reporting and Review Requirements 
The same changes that led to increased cost contingencies for Explorers also led to the 
imposition of extra reporting and review requirements. While these are appropriate to large 
programs, applying identical standards to the Explorer programs has imposed a significant 
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burden, that is seen as significant by the small PI teams, and possibly as counter-productive, as 
they re-direct resources from solving project issues. 
Again, the PILMSS has stated the case clearly:  “Particularly in the late 1990s and early 
2000s, NASA made many changes to its oversight philosophy and its views on the acceptability 
of risk in response to a series of failures and mishaps (not, however, in PI-led missions). … new 
agency-wide requirements that affected all NASA missions, including PI-led missions. The 
major changes that NASA mandated and that were incorporated into subsequent AOs include the 
addition of software IV&V and new risk management and cost reserve requirements. …  In 
addition… NASA… added oversight in the form of formal reviews beyond those agreed upon 
after selection… . … projects reported that they were increasingly required to present formal 
reviews on various technical or management issues raised by NASA officials… the burden of 
preparing, holding, and following up on action items—was significant in the view of many PIs 
and PMs. They said these formal reviews (as opposed to peer reviews) had minimal value and 
were burdensome because they took time away from critical project activities.” [PILMSS, ch.4, 
p.37: “Changes in Management and Oversight”, emphasis added.] 
We concur with the PILMSS recommendation #9: 
PILMSS recommendation #9: NASA should resist increasing PI-led mission technical and 
oversight requirements—as, for example, on quality assurance, documentation, ITA-imposed 
requirements, or the use of independent reviews—to the level of requirements for larger core 
missions and should select missions whose risks are well understood and that have plans for 
adequate and effective testing. 
Prudent lessening the oversight requirements on Explorers from those appropriate for large 
mission should be part of any review of management practices for Explorers.  
Phase B to Launch 
Explorers have averaged 4-6 years from start of Phase B to launch. It is important to maintain 
this tight schedule. Three years from the start of Phase B to launch is a very tight schedule, with 
little of the schedule margin TMCO reviews look for, and which PI teams all like to have. On 
this schedule, contracts for long-lead items must be ready to sign on day 1. A more thorough 
Phase A will make it more likely that the PI will be able to keep to such a schedule. Conversely, 
4 years should be sufficient time for a SMEX, and 5 years for a MIDEX. On the other hand, 
prolonging a development program is a sure way to run past a cost cap. This is especially true 
when it is due to the schedule being extended. 
Program Integrity and Continuity 
Both WISE and NuSTAR were nearly eliminated in 2006, in order to fund shortfalls in other 
programs. NuSTAR, the most recently selected SMEX, was abruptly cancelled in Feb 2006, two 
weeks before its initial confirmation review, and the 2006 budget of WISE, the most recently 
selected MIDEX, was cut in March 2006 by over 50%. Neither WISE nor NuSTAR were 
experiencing internal budget or technical problems. Eventually, WISE survived and NuSTAR 
was restarted in Sept 2007. Although WISE benefited from its extended Phase A study, the 
major budget cutbacks in 2006 led to a 17-month launch delay, and substantial additional cost.  
We urge NASA to strive hard to protect the funding for missions that have reached Phase B, to 
prevent significant launch slips and cancellations, with a goal of 4 to 5 years from Phase B to 
launch.
 14 
 
ORGANIZATION, PARTNERSHIPS & CURRENT STATUS 
We believe that Explorers, as the largest PI-led programs in astrophysics at NASA, form a 
crucial part of a continuum of innovation, from lab development and sub-orbital programs on 
smaller scales, through to facility-class programs on larger scales. Without the component parts 
being healthy, the program as a whole will eventually falter and the nation’s capability to build 
epoch-making large missions will wither. 
Explorers are the largest of the PI-led endeavors within NASA. Most technologies used in 
Explorers, and later used in large missions, develop out of initially small programs based on the 
ideas and initiative of a single PI. The Technical Readiness Level (TRL) formalism12 helps 
clarify this development path. From initial idea (TRL-1, ‘basic principles observed’) to TRL-6  
(‘system/subsystem demonstration in space’) to the final TRL-9 (‘flight proven’) maps to: 
• Tech. development: taking TRL-1 to TRL-4 (‘lab. Demonstration at component level’) or 
TRL-5 (‘lab. Demo in appropriate environment’) 
• Sub-orbital balloon, rocket: reaches TRL-5/-6 
• Explorer: TakeTRL-5/-6 to TRL-7 in Phase A, TRL-9 for flight. 
The status of Explorer development in this framework has limitations, as described in the 
previous sections. Funding for basic technology development is limited (details), while the sub-
orbital program is at a historical low point. Other White Papers address these areas. 
The goal of one astrophysics Explorer launch per year matches well with the, independently 
derived, goal of the ASRAT Rocket Program White Paper. They say: “So what does the 
community require? GALEX provides a case study. They employed 6 Ph.D. instrumentalist and 
required the development of ~ 4 new technologies with sounding rocket heritage.  So the 
combined yearly output of 12 sounding rocket programs, assuming no attrition, is just able to 
sustain the workforce and technical needs of 1 Explorer program per year.” 
A strength of the Explorer program is the wide range of institutions involved. The list of 
institutions of the co-authors of this White Paper illustrates this. 
 
 
                                                
12 http://www.hq.nasa.gov/office/codeq/trl/ 
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COST ESTIMATES 
NASA Explorer Budget 
The Explorer program was highly active between 1995 and 2003. During those years six 
MIDEX and five SMEXs were selected for flight though two were eventually cancelled.  
The approximate total costs, including program management overhead, was ~$1700M. The 
average program expenditure during these years was about $200M real year dollars per year.   
The program then had a drastic drop off with no missions selected between 2003 and 2009. 
The result was a decrease in budget to less than ~$10M per year. There is new life in the 
program with NuSTAR moved to flight status and SMEX proposals currently under review.  
The budget projections are currently in the $150M per year range for the next five years. 
SMEX Budget: a worked example 
Below we give a sample breakdown for major categories from a recent SMEX proposal. The 
individual numbers do not match the actual proposal, but rather are average numbers from 
several sources for each category. The details of the payload were unique to this mission, of 
course, but there was no new technology, or any particular performance requirement that had not 
been achieved in other modest missions.  The total is $10M over the cost cap. There was no 
guest observer program, and data archiving and distribution were provided by MAST with only a 
very small cost charged to the mission. 
There are many ways to break down these costs, of course. A somewhat more capable than 
average spacecraft was required; a more basic S/C would have come in around $32M. Fairly 
consistent quotes for the S/C came from three different vendors. Other contributions to the costs 
were roughly independent of mission characteristics. 
 
Phase A                                 $0.75M 
Project management              $3.5M 
Systems engineering              $1.5M 
Mission Assurance                 $1M 
Spacecraft bus                      $36M (incl. S/C engineering and S/C I&T) 
Payload                                $28M 
(incl. H/W, engineering, instr. I&T) 40-cm telescope, standard detectors, some custom 
electronics 
Satellite I&T                           $2.5M 
Flight Ops Center                    $7.5M 
    includes:  pre-launch development        $2.5M 
                     flight operations (2yrs)          $3.5M 
          Ground station (antenna usage)      $1.5M 
Science Data processinga         $3M 
Science team                           $5M 
(incl. E/PO) 
Launch operations                   $1M 
Total:                                     $89.5 
30% reserves (not applied to science team):  $25.4 
Grand total:                       $114.95 
 a. Includes: data processing pipeline development. post-launch processing, archiving, distribution, data calibration. 
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ACTIVITY SCHEDULE 
“NASA is an evolving organization that learns from past experience, events, and 
new information and responds to administrative interests and factors”   
[PILMSS, ch.4, p.37.] 
We consider the, peer reviewed, PI led, Explorer, sub-orbital, and technology development 
programs to be all vital components of a coherent NASA development strategy to enable the 
long-term health of the nation’s space program, including the health of large mission programs.  
We recommend and urge that NASA, in order to create a vigorous Explorer program: 
1. Achieve the Long-advocated Astrophysics Explorer Flight Rate of 1/year.  
to provide the low-cost, rapid response, new technology and training resource that the Explorer 
program was always intended to be. We urge NASA to include an enhanced Explorer program in 
its FY11 budget request. 
 
2. Create a Task Force on ‘Innovative Approaches to Small Missions’. 
This task force should involve NASA, PI-class scientists, spacecraft vendors, launch companies. 
The Task Force should consider at least: 
A. Can reporting/review procedures be reduced, simplified? 
B. Can contingency reserves be lowered by funding technology development and longer, 
stronger Phase A studies. 
C. Should contingency reserves apply equally to all mission elements? 
D. How can NASA encourage savings using external groups? 
E. A stronger sub-orbital program to raise the TRL of pivotal technologies, so mitigating 
the risk of using such technologies in Explorer missions. 
F. Is SMEX/MIDEX distinction still useful? Is the SMEX program is meeting its intended 
objectives? 
G. Would Wallops (WFF) launches enable streamlined procedures? 
H. Reassess the SMEX cost cap based on what was learned from items A-G. 
The Task Force should complete its report within a year, to allow NASA to incorporate its 
findings into FY2011 planning. 
 
3. Take an active role in fostering capable, low cost, US launch vehicles. 
We envisage medium-class LV, in the $10M-$18M cost bracket, capable of delivering 1000 kg 
to LEO, and possibly even to Earth trailaway or L2 orbits. Non-US launchers of this capability 
exist, and challenge the US dominance of the space industry. 
 
4. Make a strong investment in the personnel side of the Explorer program. 
The people and teams trained as part of the Explorer program have the real world experience to 
take them into the next league, and produces the new project leaders and PIs who will be needed 
when the current baby-boomer generation retires. There simply aren't enough new people 
coming up through the system to take their place. Without this training NASA will be left with 
"green", unseasoned, people running large projects 
 
6. Follow the PILMSS recommendations [Appendix A]. 
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Appendix A: PILMSS recommendations: 
1. NASA should consider modifying the PI-led mission selection process in the following ways: 
* Revise the required content of the mission proposals to allow informed selection while minimizing the 
burden on the proposing and reviewing communities by, for example, reconsidering the TMC-lite 
approach and eliminating the need for content that restates program requirements or provides detailed 
descriptions such as schedules that would be better left for post-selection concept studies, 
* Alter the order of the review process by removing low- to medium-ranking science proposals from the 
competition before the TMC review, and  
* Allow review panels to further query proposers of the most promising subset of concepts for 
clarification, as necessary. 
2. NASA should increase the funding for and duration of concept studies (Phase A) to ensure that more 
accurate information on cost, schedule, and technical readiness is available for final selection of PI-led 
missions. 
3. NASA should make explicit all factors to be considered in the selection of PI-led missions—for 
example, targets and/or technologies that are especially timely and any factors related to allocating work 
among institutions and NASA centers. 
4. NASA should develop PI/PM teams whose combined experience and personal commitment to the 
proposed implementation plan can be evaluated. NASA should also provide opportunities for scientists 
and engineers to gain practical spaceflight experience before they become involved in PI-led or core 
NASA missions. These opportunities could become available as a result of revitalizing some smaller 
flight programs, such as the sounding rocket and University-class Explorer programs.  
5. NASA should set aside meaningful levels of regular funding in PI-led programs to sponsor relevant, 
competed technology development efforts. The results from these program-oriented activities should be 
made openly available on the program library Web site and in articles published in journals or on the 
World Wide Web. 
6. NASA and individual mission PIs should mutually agree on a funding profile that will support mission 
development and execution as efficiently as possible. If NASA must later deviate from that profile, the 
mission cost cap should be adjusted upward to cover the cost of the inefficiency that results from the 
change in funding profile (see Recommendation 10). 
7. NASA PI-led-mission program officials should use recent experiences with ITAR to clarify for 
proposers (in the AO) and for selected projects (e.g., in guidance on writing technical assistance 
agreements and transferal letters) the appropriate application of ITAR rules and regulations. 
8. NASA should ensure stability at its program offices, while providing sufficient personnel and authority 
to enable their effectiveness, both in supporting their missions and in reporting to and planning with 
NASA Headquarters. 
9. NASA should resist increasing PI-led mission technical and oversight requirements—as, for example, 
on quality assurance, documentation, ITA-imposed requirements, or the use of independent reviews—to 
the level of requirements for larger core missions and should select missions whose risks are well 
understood and that have plans for adequate and effective testing. 
10. NASA should clarify the change-of-scope procedures available for projects to negotiate the cost and 
schedule impacts of any changes in requirements initiated by NASA Headquarters. 
11. NASA should continue to use the existing termination review process to decide the fate of PI-led 
missions that exceed their cost cap. It should develop lessons learned from termination reviews and make 
them available to other PI-led projects. 
12. NASA should not descope mission capabilities (including science instruments) without the PI’s 
agreement or outside the termination review process. 
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Appendix B: Explorer Missions 1989-present (From PILMSS) 
 
TABLE 2.1 Explorer Missions, 1989-Present 
 
 
No
. 
Name Classa  Principal Investigatorb Notesc 
66 Cosmic Background 
Explorer (COBE) 
  Early-style PI mission-science lead: 
John Mather, GSFC 
CMBR, anisotropy, infrared 
67 Extreme Ultraviolet Explorer 
(EUVE) 
  Early-style PI mission-science lead: 
Stuart Bowyer, UC Berkeley 
EUV full-sky survey, deep 
survey, ISM 
68 Solar Anomalous and 
Magnetospheric Particle 
Explorer (SAMPEX) 
SMEX Early-style PI mission-science lead: 
Glenn Mason, 
University of Maryland 
Cosmic rays, magnetosphere 
69 Rossi X-Ray Timing 
Explorer (RXTE) 
Explorer Early-style PI mission-science lead: 
Richard Rothschild (UCSD), Jean 
Swank (GSFC), Hale Bradt (MIT). 
X-ray spectral phenomena of 
stellar and galactic systems 
70 Fast Auroral Snapshot 
Explorer (FAST) 
SMEX Early-style PI mission-science lead: 
Charles Carlson, UC Berkeley 
Plasma physics, aurora 
71 Advanced Composition 
Explorer (ACE) 
Explorer Early-style PI mission-science lead: 
Ed Stone, Caltech 
Solar corona, IPM, ISM, cosmic 
rays 
72 Student Nitric Oxide 
Explorer (SNOE) 
UNEX/STEDI Charles Barth, 
University of Colorado 
Nitric oxide density fluctuations 
in thermosphere due to solar and 
auroral activity 
73 Transition Region and 
Coronal Explorer (TRACE) 
SMEX Early-style PI mission-science lead: 
Alan Title, Lockheed Martin 
Solar photosphere, magnetism, 
flares 
74 Submillimeter Wave 
Astronomy Satellite (SWAS) 
SMEX Early-style PI mission-science lead: 
Gary Melnick, HSCA 
Interstellar clouds, star/planet 
formation 
75 Wide-Field Infrared 
Explorer Mission (WIRE) 
SMEX Early-style PI mission-science lead: 
Perry Hacking, JPL 
Protogalaxies at different 
redshifts (technical failure) 
76 Tomographic Experiment 
Using Radiative 
Recombinative Ionospheric 
EUV and Radio Sources 
(TERRIERS) 
UNEX/STEDI Daniel Cotton, Boston University Ionosphere electron 
density/photo-emission (technical 
failure) 
77 Far Ultraviolet Spectroscopic 
Explorer (FUSE) 
Explorer Warren Moos, Johns Hopkins 
University (PI-led after design definition 
phase) 
Origin/evolution of deuterium, 
galaxies, stars in far UV 
